|
The mercantile movement in the Ukraine, as, in fact,
in all of Eastern Europe, is comparatively slight. To give
an exact picture of Ukrainian commerce is much more
difficult than to describe its agricultural and industrial
production. The great exchanges of goods in the interior,
the commercial relations of. the Ukraine with the other dis-
tricts of Russia and Austria-Hungary, its part in the export
trade of these states, all this matter awaits working up on
the part of competent economists and geographers.
The Ukrainian people take but little part in the com-
mercial activity of their country; the Ukrainian peasant
simply considers trade an occupation very little in accord
with the rank of a landed proprietor, and the middle class
has only begun in the last decades to recover from the
suppression of centuries. Hence, Ukrainian commerce lies
almost wholly in the hands of the foreign races the
Russians, Jews, Armenians and Greeks.
The causes of this condition are usually sought and
found by the foreign (Russian and Polish) "standard-bearers
of culture" in the indifference and incapacity for culture
of the Ukrainians. This explanation, however, can be
objected to when we recall the great commercial importance
of the ancient Kingdoms of Kiev and Halich, as well as
the long perseverance of the Ukrainian trade down into
the 16th Century, despite its systematic suppression by the
Polish Government. Naturally, the five centuries of
Tatar invasion caused severe injuries to Ukrainian
trade. And when the commercial activity of the Ukraine
of the hetmans began to flourish in the 17th and 18th
Centuries, it was systematically suppressed by the Russian
Government, following the ill-fated rebellion of Mazeppa.
Then we must consider the difficulties of competition with
the Russians, a very talented commercial race, with the
Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks. Most keenly,
however, the calamitous lack of education is being felt.
Wherever the education of the people is more advanced,
as, for example, in Eastern Galicia, there is a revival of the
commercial spirit in the Ukrainians. The Galician Ukrain-
ians have thousands of shops, large commercial co-opera-
tive organizations (Narodna Torhovla, with seventeen
branch warehouses and several hundred shops, Soyuz
tohorvelnick spilok, Soyuz zbutu khudobi, etc.), with the
large annual turnover (large for Galician conditions) of
25 million crowns. The enlightened peasantry of Sinevidsko
and vicinity (Boiko country) carries on an active fruit-
trade far beyond the Austrian borders. Even in the
Russian Ukraine trade is coming to life in all places. The
co-operative movement has taken such a bound in advance,
in spite of the frightful illiteracy, that in 1912 there were
over 2500 such organizations, while all of Russia (including
the Ukraine) had 5260, and Poland only 920. From these
facts we may safely conclude that, with the elevation of
the grade of culture, the former commercial spirit of the
Ukraine is reawakening. To be sure, the sturdy, upright
nature of the Ukrainian, which abhors every form of
dishonesty, will not lend to this new commercial spirit a
world-conquering character, but it will, on the other hand,
increase the influence of the Ukrainian merchant in the
commercial world.
The present condition of commerce in the Ukraine is
still very primitive; first, because of the generally low grade
of culture; second, because of the very primitive traffic
conditions of Eastern Europe.
The first mark of the primitive condition is probably
the existence of countless annual fairs in the Ukraine a
relic of medieval trade conditions. The number of annual
fairs in the Russian Ukraine exceeds 4000, altho it is
far out of proportion to the great number of annual fairs
in Great Russia. But out of twenty-two grand annual
fairs of Russia, eleven fall to the Ukrainian territory
four in Kharkiv, two in Romny, one in Poltava, Kursk,
Kolevez, Yelisavet and Sumy, respectively. In addition,
there are the once famous Kiev "kontrakti" (now declining),
and the smaller annual fairs in Berdichiv, Zitomir, Dubno,
etc. The greatest exchanges of goods take place in the
Yordan fair in Kharkiv (January 20th), and the Elias fair
(August 2nd) in Poltava. Here the wholesale dealers sell
their goods to the retailers (Ofenyi Russians from the
Governments of Vladimir and Slobozani Russian sec-
tarians, colonists from the Chernihiv country, Jewish
retailers who sell in the right half of the Ukraine), who buy
or supplement their stock of goods during the annual
fairs. In these wholesale transactions, the so-called prassoli
Russian barterers also engage, dealers who travel all
year thru the villages of the Ukraine, exchange the wool,
bristles and flax of the peasants for hardware, and sell the
collected raw materials to the wholesalers. In this annual
fair system, the Ukrainians have, until recently, played an
important part as paid drivers, who drove the goods on
their oxcarts from fair to fair. These drivers at one time
formed a sort of class of their own the "chumaki" and
even engaged independently in the trading of the Crimean
salt and the dried fish of the Sea of Azof. The railroads
have put an end to the former importance of the chumaki,
yet the scanty length of the Ukrainian railway system pre-
vents this carting industry from disappearing altogether.
In the eighties of the past century there were counted in
the districts of Poltava, Kharkiv and Chernihiv, 210,000
chumaks; in the year 1897, in Kherson, Katerinoslav,
Tauria and Don, about 100,000 of these hired drivers.
The fair system of Ukrainian trade is carried on not
only by means of great annual fairs, which, by the way, are
decreasing in importance year by year, but also by means
of an enormous number of smaller annual fairs in the cities,
towns, and even villages of the Russian Ukraine, which
take care of the retail trade. In the Austrian Ukraine the
annual fairs (as for instance, the once famous fairs of
Tarnopol, Ulashkivtzi, Czernowitz) have lost all significance
since the modernization of the country's commerce.
World-commerce has, until very recently, left the
Ukraine almost untouched. This is one of the reasons why
the primitive forms of commerce were able to last so long in
the Ukraine. Until recently, world-commerce has taken
the Ukraine merely for a producing and exporting country
of raw materials, and left the supplying of local demands to
the traditional forms of trade. Only within the last de-
cades has the modern commercial organization begun
slowly to take in the Ukraine. The exchanges in Kiev,
Khatkiv, Odessa, Kreminchuk, Mikolaiv, Tahanroh, Ros-
tiv, the chambers of commerce in Lviv and Brodi, are
organizing the export of raw materials from the Ukraine,
and the flooding of the country with the products of foreign
industry is becoming more and more intensive.
In spite of all we have mentioned, the significance of
the Ukraine in the internal commerce of Russia and in
world-trade is very great. The natural resources of the
country, its situation on the threshold of Asia and the
Mediterranean world, its property of being a direct hinter-
land of the Black Sea, give to the Ukraine a commercial
importance with which that of any other individual
district of European Russia, the Baltic lands and Poland
not excepted, can never compare.
In the internal commerce of Russia, the Ukraine figures,
first of all, as purveyor of foodstuffs, and in Austria-Hun-
gary the Austrian Ukraine plays the same part on a small
scale. To represent these relations in figures encounters
great difficulties, and the figures can be only approximate.
In 1895 the Ukraine exported over 1.5 million metric
hundredweights of grain to Lithuania and White Russia,
about 1.7 million metric hundredweights to Poland, and
about 0.9 million metric hundredweights to Central Russia.
In 1905, two Ukrainian districts alone, Poltava and Khar-
kiv, exported over 0.7 metric hundredweights of grain to
Central Russia. These figures must be much greater today.
And the grain exportation of the Austrian Ukraine to the
interior of Austria must be relatively as great. As a
matter of fact, Galicia produces one-third of the total
Austrian output of oats and wheat, and almost half the
output of potatoes.
Quite as important is the Ukraine's exportation of
live-stock. In the years 1902 1904, the Ukraine exported
80,000 head of cattle to Central Russia, and the part
played by Galicia as purveyor of live-stock for slaughter is
well-known. Equally important is the exportation of small
cattle, poultry, eggs and butter. The exportation of wool
from the Southern Ukraine plays an important part in the
internal commerce of Russia. The Polissye, Carpathian and
Caucasus regions furnish great quantities of lumber for ex-
portation. The mineral products of the Ukraine are used
for the greater part outside the country Caucasian and
Carpathian petroleum, the iron ore of Krivi Rih, the salt,
the manganese, the coal of the Donetz Plateau. Of the
entire yield of coal of the Donetz basin in 1905, barely one-
third was used up in the factories of this region; the other
two-thirds were to serve the advancement of Central
Russian industry. All these products are the object of an
active export trade.
In comparison with the exports, the imports of the
Ukraine cannot be very large. The imports embrace,
almost exclusively, products of foreign manufacturing.
In view of the general poverty and the very limited
wants of the Ukrainian peasantry, these imports must be
small, since home industry still covers the greatest part of
the demand.
The part of the Ukraine in the external commerce of the
Russian State is very important, while the Austrian Ukraine
plays a very subordinate part in this respect. The ten
central regions of the Ukraine furnish over 60% of the
total grain export of Russia. In the customs districts of
the Ukrainian part of the western border of Russia, 28.6
million rubles' worth of goods was exported, 14.3 million
rubles imported. The customs districts of the Pontian
and Azof coast within the borders of the Ukraine passed
245 million rubles in exports, 64.8 million rubles in
imports. Over the borders of Russian Ukraine passed 33%
of the Russian exportation and only 1 1% of the importation.
This shows us how much the Ukraine contributes to the
balance of trade in favor of Russia.
Traffic in the Ukraine is very slightly developed.
Altho the natural conditions for traffic are very favorable,
the historical fortunes of the country took such a course
that we cannot wonder at the present state of intercourse.
The Ukraine was for a long time under the domination of
Poland, which never cared for the condition of the roads;
then the country fell under the rule of Russia, which to this
day stands upon a very low level as far as traffic conditions
are concerned. The Austrian Ukraine has the greatest
number and the best roads, but they are found especially
in Bukowina and Northern Hungary. For in Galicia,
where most of the roads are under the management of the
autonomous Polish authorities, the condition of the roads
is sad enough.
The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian highways
are unpaved. All that the Russian geographer, Krassnov,
has said in general about the highways of Russia, applies
in its fullest extent to the unpaved, unmacadamized roads
of the Ukraine. These roads are among the worst in the
world. In the summer they are enveloped in clouds of
dust; in the spring and fall, as well as in rainy weather,
they are strips of bottomless mud, in which even the light
farm-wagon sinks to its axles. Wherever it is at all
possible, vehicles drive across the fields along the roadway.
Worst of all are the f ways in the vicinity of and within
villages and small towns. Drains and bridges are either
unknown, or else there are not enough of them. The kind
of roads just described are known in the entire right half
of the Ukraine by the traditional name of "Polish roads."
Still worse are the cane and corduroy roads of the Polissye ;
riding over these a long time becomes a positive torture to
the traveler. In the Hutzul country most of the roads are
ordinary bridle-paths {plat), accessible only to foot passen-
gers and bridle-horses.
In Galicia, only villages and hamlets are connected by
unpaved roads; in the Russian Ukraine even large cities.
Not a single macadamized road leads to cities like Poltava,
Kreminchuk, Katerinoslav, Rostiv, Kherson. That such
negligence of the government should cause the Ukrainian
peasantry incalculable damage, and actually hinder trade
and commerce, is obvious at once.
Macadamized roads are very scarce in the Ukraine as a
whole. The Austro-Hungarian part of the Ukraine, altho
in this respect it is far behind the cultural countries of
Europe, possesses a greater absolute number of macadamized
roads than the Russian Ukraine, which is ten times as
large in area. All cities and towns of the Austrian Ukraine
are connected by macadamized roads. Eight such roads
meet at Lemberg, seven in Czernowitz, six each in Peremi-
shl, Ternopil, Kolomia, Buchach, Horodenka, etc. In
the Russian Ukraine, on the other hand, the only macada-
mized roads that deserve the name, are the road from
Homel to Kiev, the road from Kiev to Berestia (by way of
Zitomir, Novhorod Volinski, Rivne, with branches to
Dubno and to Kremianetz, Lutzk, Kovil), the road from
Tomashiv to Lublin, the road from Starokonstantiniv
to Kamenetz, the road from Kursk to Kharkiv, and the
mountain-road in the Yaila Mountains in Crimea. The
remaining "great tracts" and "post-roads" (altho they
sometimes figure as macadamized roads) are in such a
miserable condition, that even in the large cities they look
more like moraines than streets in a civilized city.
Quite analogous conditions prevail, also, in the railroad
traffic of the Ukraine. In this respect, too, the Austrian
Ukraine surpasses the Russian Ukraine by far, despite the
backward condition of the former. Galicia, for instance,
has 5 kilometers of railroad for 100 square kilometers of
surface, the Russian Ukraine barely 1 kilometer. Besides
the loose mesh of the railway-net of the Ukraine, there is
the additional disadvantage that its lines tend toward
foreign centers, and consider the local needs of Ukrainian
traffic only in rare cases. Galicia, separated from the rest
of Austria-Hungary by the natural boundary of the
Carpathians, has had to develop an independent system of
railways, with the main junction at Lemberg. In the
Russian Ukraine all the main lines were built only for the
convenience of the Moscow center and the Baltic ports.
Hence, there is no direct railway line between Kiev and
Odessa, for instance, or to Kharkiv, while there exist
almost straight line connections between Romen and Libau,
between Sevastopol and Kharkiv and Moscow. Besides
that, strategic factors were the deciding ones in the building
of the railroads (particularly in Western Ukraine), and
the economic life of the country often has had to suffer for it.
A third disadvantageous aspect of the Russian Ukrain-
ian railway system is its tariff regulations, the purpose of
which is to concentrate the greatest possible amount of
traffic on the railroads of Central Russia and the Baltic
provinces, and thus redound to their advantage. As a result
of this tariff policy of the Russian Government, it happens
that it is sometimes cheaper to transport goods from the
Ukraine to the most distant Baltic ports, than to the ad-
jacent ports of the Black Sea. Thus, the tariff rates for grain
from Romen to Libau (1077 versts) are 21 kopeks per pud,
from Romen to Mikolaiv (429 kilometers) 18 kopeks. It
costs more money and trouble to transport coal from the
Donetz region to the Black Sea ports than to the ports of
the Baltic, which, of course, are far more distant. Naturally
Pontian navigation suffers above all from this cause, but
all Ukrainian trade in general suffers likewise.
As a result of the loose web of the net of railroads,
and the destination of all the railroad lines in the Ukraine
to foreign centers, there are almost no important railway
centers in the Ukraine. The only center of European
proportions is Lemberg, where nine main and local lines
meet. Striy, Stanislaviv, Kolomia and Ternopil are
smaller junctions, with five converging lines. In the
Russian Ukraine, only Berestia and Kharkiv deserve the
name of railway junction, in the strict sense of being a
point of intersection of at least two main lines ; the same is
true of Poltava and Rostiv. The dependence of the Ukrain-
ian railway lines upon foreign centers is the cause of the
fact that frequently very important crossings lie beyond
large towns, near to some miserable little village, as for
example, Sarni, Bakhmach, Kosiatin, Zmerinka, etc. The
only concentrated district of the Ukrainian railroad system
with numerous local junctions, lies in the Donetz Plateau.
We shall now enumerate several railroads of the Ukraine
which are most important for the traffic of the country.
The Ukraine is connected with the Black Sea by means of
seven main lines: Lemberg-Odessa, Znamenka-Mikolaiv,
Kharkiv-Sevastopol (with a branch to Kerch), Kat-
erinoslav-Berdiansk, Donetz Plateau-Mariupol, Donetz
Plateau-Tahanroh, Katerinodar-Novorossysk. Direct rail-
road connections with Roumania exist via Tiraspol to Yassy,
and from Lemberg by way of Czernowitz to Bukarest.
The following lines lead into Hungary: Stanislaviv-Sihot,
Lemberg-Mukachiv, Lemberg- Uzhorod-Peremishl-Uihely.
The connection with Austrian-Poland (Western Galicia)
is formed by the Lemberg-Cracow and Stanislaviv-New-
Sandetz lines, the connection with Russian-Poland by the
lines of Kovel-Lublin-Warsaw and Berestia-Sidletz- Warsaw.
The lines of Berestye-Bilostok, Rivne-Vilna, and Romen-
Minsk-Libau lead north to White Russia, Lithuania and
the Baltic. The Ukraine is connected with the north and
northeast (Great Russia) by the lines of Kiev-Kursk,
Kharkiv-Moscow, Kupiansk-Penza-Samara, and Donetz
Plateau-Voroniz. Eastward, the railroad lines run from
the Donetz region and Katerinodar to the bend of the
Volga, and from Rostiv along the Caucasus to Baku.
In the Ukraine itself, the main lines of the railroads
should run in a direction west and northwest to east and
southeast. Hence, the main paths of traffic should be the
following lines: Czernowitz-Odessa, Berestye-Rivne-Ber-
dichiv-Uman, Kovel-Kiev-Poltava-Donetz region-Rostiv,
Fastiv - Katerinoslav, Novosibkiv - Sumi -Kharkiv-Donetz
Plateau, etc. As a result of the railroad policy of the Russian
Government, the north and south lines, which lead directly
or indirectly to the Muscovite centers, are held to be more
important, as for instance, the following: Berestye-Minsk-
Moscow, Lemberg- Rivne-Vilna, Novoselitza- Kiev-Kursk,
Vapniarka-Cherkassi-Piriatin, Mikolaiv-Kreminchuk-Ro-
mni, Balta-Kreminchuk-Kharkiv-Kursk, etc. Of greatest
importance are, also, the industrial railroads which connect
the iron mines of Krivi Rih with the coal-fields of the Donetz
region, via Katerinoslav.
The waterways of the Ukraine were at one time the main
roads of trade and commerce. The great cultural mission
of the Ukrainian waterways is familiar from history; thru
the course of long centuries they were the only convenient
thorofares thru the difficult forest regions and the pathless
steppes of the Ukraine. Traffic on the Ukrainian water-
ways was, in former times, much more important than at
present, not only because of the lack of other convenient
pathways, but also because of their former greater length
and capacity. Deforestation has decreased the normal
level of the rivers; mill-dams have cut off the once navigable
stretches of water.
The Ukraine possesses almost no artificial waterways.
The only ones in existence the Orginski Canal (Yassiolda-
Vihonivske ozero-Shchara, 54 kilometers of canal, 124
kilometers of connected watercourses) and the Dnieper-
Buh Canal (Pina-Mokhavez, 81 kilometers of canal, 134
kilometers of connected watercourses) were built back
in the days of Polish rule. They are antiquated, shallow
and neglected, so they can serve only occasionally, and
then only for log-floating.
The total length of Ukrainian waterways exceeds 7000
kilometers, which is just as much as the length of the
waterways of Austria or of England, but only one- tenth
that of European Russia. In this figure, sections of rivers
are included which are navigable only for smaller river
vessels.
The statement of the navigability of individual rivers
of the Ukraine is contained in the section which deals with
the rivers of the Ukraine (v. p. 70 ff .) .
The most important waterway of the Ukraine is the
Dnieper system. The main river is navigable in its entire
Ukrainian section by the largest river vessels. In the entire
Russian river system the Dnieper system constitutes 11%
of the length, 10% of the total navigable length, 16% of
the length navigable by steamship-lines. The rapids
section, however, as a result of the incomprehensible
negligence of the Russian Government, is, to this day,
accessible only to the smaller ships and rafts, and then only
for sailing downstream. The canals built by the Govern-
ment in the Porohi (1843 1856) are so badly placed that
navigation, to this day, must still keep largely to the
natural ancient "Cossack paths." In the years 1893 1895,
investigating engineering commissions determined that it
was possible, without great cost, to make the Porohi section
completely navigable. But the thing never went any
further than that. At the beginning of the 20th Century,
English engineers worked out a plan for the complete
regulation of the Pohori section and the construction of a
waterway, accessible even to sea-going ships, which should
connect the Baltic with the Black Sea by means of the
Dvina and the Dnieper. The realization of this plan,
which would be of the very greatest importance to the
Ukraine, is still distant, and there is no hope that the
Russian Government will attack it very soon.
Thus, the rapids hinder Dnieper navigation to this day,
and not least for the reason that the insurance companies
will not insure vessels for the rapids section. For this
reason, the river fleet of the Dnieper is separated into
two parts. Above the rapids (in 1900) 208 steamboats and
1002 other ships, below the rapids (together with the inlets
of the Boh) 148 steamboats and 1203 other ships were
plying. The number of steamboats increased threefold
above the rapids and doubled below the rapids during the
last sixteen years of the last century. The total horse power
in 1900 was over 16,000. In 1906 the number of steamers
of the Dnieper region was 382, the number of other ships
2218.
The Dnieper ships, propelled by sails and oars, which
carry lumber, grain, fruit and other goods, are of various
types. The largest are called "honchaki," and have a
tonnage of up to 1400; then come the "barzi" and "barki"
(9001300 tons), "berlini" (8001140 tons), which are
the most useful, "baidaki" (650 tons), "trembaki,"
"laibi," "dubi" (130160 tons), "lodki" (80 tons),
"galari" (50 tons), and "chaiki" (30 tons). The tonnage
of the river fleet of the Dnieper (not counting steamers), in
1900, was approximately 500,000 tons, hence not much less
than the tonnage of the present Austro-Hungarian mer-
chant-marine.
Besides this, the Dnieper and its tributaries are navi-
gated by a great number of rafts. In 1910 the number of
them was 15,676.
Of the river harbors of the Dnieper system, Kherson
carries on the greatest exchange of goods (10 million q. in
1910). Then follow Kiev (5.3 million q.), Katerinoslav
(3.1 million q.), Cherkassi (2.1 million q.), Niznodniprovsk
(1 million q.), Chernihiv (0.6 million q.), and Pinsk (0.5
million q.).
Navigation on the Don, as a result of the small volume
of water, is much slighter than the Dnieper navigation,
despite the absence of rapids. In 1900, the number of
steamboats on the Don was 189, with 10,000 horse- power
(in 1906 it was 382); the number of other ships 488, with
200,000 tonnage (in 1906 only 471 ships). The main river-
harbor is Rostiv, which handles goods to the amount of
7.5 million q. annually.
A good deal smaller still is the navigation of the Dniester.
Here, in 1900, there were only 9 steamers, with 200 horse-
power (16 steamers in 1906), and 187 ships of other kinds
with a tonnage of 22,000 tons (277 of them in 1906).
The harbors of the main stream are Benderi (handles 0.7
million q. of goods) and Maiaki (0.5 million q.). On the
Kuban River 69 steamers (counting in those of the Kura)
and 131 other ships plied in 1906.
In general, river navigation in the Ukraine is on a very
moderate scale. The negligence of the Russian Govern-
ment and the low grade of culture limit the development
of Ukrainian interior navigation. Thru the regulation of the
Dnieper rapids and the connection of the river systems of
the Dnieper and Dniester with the Baltic waters, by means
of practicable canals, the waterways of the Ukraine could
attain a wonderful importance.
Having come to the end of our description of Ukrainian
traffic, we must still devote some attention to Ukrainian
sea-navigation. Its present condition is as lamentable
as the general condition of Ukrainian traffic. Of course,
there is no doubt that the Black Sea has many qualities
unfavorable to the development of navigation its seclu-
sion, the lack of good harbors, and an abundance of danger-
ous storms. Yet, what are these disadvantages against
modern engineering? To assign all the blame to the low
grade of Russian industry, as the Russian publicists are in
the habit of doing, will not do. The causes of the slight
development of Pontian navigation should be sought in the
low cultural conditions of the ruling Russian nation and in
the indolence of the government, which is not properly
encouraging this navigation. The Russian steamers do
not enjoy a good reputation on the Black Sea. Pontian
coastwise navigation, which at the beginning of the 19th
Century had a splendid start, and was carried on pre-
dominantly by Ukrainians, has not been able to develop
properly under the heavy fist of the government. Today,
conditions on the Black Sea are such, that the transporta-
tion of a unit by weight of goods from one Pontian harbor
to another, costs just as much as the transportation of the
same unit from the same port to England.
The number of steamers which sail the Black Sea under
the Russian flag was, in 1901, only 316, with a tonnage of
187,000 tons, that is, 42% of the number and 52% of the
tonnage of the entire steamship fleet of Russia. In 1912
the figures were 410 steamers, 223,000 tons, the percentages
being 42% and 47%. The number of sailing vessels in
1901 was 635, with a total tonnage of 47,000, and in the
year 1912 there were 827 sailing vessels, with over 53,000
tons. The development of Pontian navigation is thus
going a very slow, if not a retrogressive course.
The Russian Black Sea steamers maintain a more or
less regular service between the most important Black Sea
ports Odessa, Mikolaiv, Kherson, Sevastopol, Rostiv,
Novorossysk, etc. From Sevastopol a line goes to Con-
stantinople, from Odessa one to Alexandria and Vladivostok.
Despite this miserable condition of Pontian navigation,
from a European point of view, it still has greater signifi-
cance than navigation on other seas of Russia. Near the
end of the past century, 70% of the total oversea exporta-
tion of Russia by weight, and 65% by value, went thru the
harbors of the Ukrainian coast. To be sure, in 1896, only
7.5% of the ships which visited these ports sailed under the
Russian flag. In the year of 1911 it was not much different ;
of the outgoing ships only 11.4%, and of the incoming
ships only 13.9% carried the Russian flag!
Among the Black Sea ports, Odessa, now, as ever, takes
first place. The imports of Odessa, in 1911, amounted to
19.2 million q., the exports 26.2 million q. This, by the
way, is an example of the great preponderance of
exportation oyer importation. In other ports the disparity
is even greater. Thus, the imports of Mikolaiv amount to
only 2.3 million q., the exports 22.8 million q. For Tahan-
roh the respective figures are 1.9 and 19.5, for Novorossysk
1.5 and 18.3, for Mariupol 3.1 and 16.2, for Kherson 1.1
and 11.3, for Feodosia 0.6 and 4.8, for Rostiv 2.1 and 2.4,
for Berdiansk 0.3 and 3.9, for Eupatoria 0.8 and 2.9, for
Akerman 0.4 and 2.0.
These figures once more bring before our eyes the
ruinous effect of the economic policy of the Russian Govern-
ment upon the Ukraine. The natural resources of the
Ukraine are exported in enormous masses, without
consideration of the needs of the Ukrainian population;
the imports are to a great extent directed to other far
distant coasts of the Russian Empire, and Great Russia
gets the advantage of them, while the Ukraine is flooded
with the inferior goods of Central Russian industry. If we
consider, further, that an annual customs balance of 200
million rubles goes to the central government from the
Ukraine, an amount which is then used for the develop-
ment of the central provinces, we become able to under-
stand under what unfavorable conditions the economic
life of the Ukraine must develop, and how dearly its progress
must be paid for.
|
|
